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Abstract 
 
This  paper  describes  a  unifying  framework  for  five 
highly  influential  but  disparate  theories  (the  five 
factors)  of  natural  learning  and  behavioral  action 
selection.  These  theories  are  normally  considered 
independently, with their own experimental procedures 
and  results.  The  framework  builds  on  a  structure  of 
connection types, propagation rules and learning rules, 
which are used in combination to integrate results from 
each  theory  into  a  whole.  Exemplar  experimental 
procedures will be used to discuss the areas of genuine 
difference, and to identify areas where there is overlap 
and  where  apparently  disparate  findings  have  a 
common  source.  The  paper  focuses  on  predictive  or 
anticipatory  properties  inherent  in  these  action 
selection and learning theories, and uses the Dynamic 
Expectancy  Model  and  its  computer  implementation 
SRS/E as a mechanism to conduct this discussion.    
1    Introduction 
The  overall  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  a  unifying 
description  to  encompass  and  combine  five  classical  and 
highly influential “theories” of natural action selection and 
learning.  These  are  the  five  factor  theories.  Each  held  a 
dominant place in theorizing during the 20
th century and 
was  supported  by  a  wealth  of  meticulously  gathered 
experimental data, but there has been little or no attempt to 
provide  a  single  framework  with  which  to  rationally 
consider how they might interact.  
The  problem,  in  part,  arises  from  the  fact  that  these 
theories have been treated as largely competitive, at times 
with  considerable  animosity  being  generated  between 
proponents of the differing approaches, or, more often, a 
tacit isolationism between the different schools of thought.  
Such isolationism is surprising, as it clear that individual 
animals  will  demonstrate  a  whole  range  of  behavioral 
phenomena,  each  of  which  might  be  most  satisfactorily 
described  by  one  or  another  of  the  approaches,  largely 
depending on the circumstances the animal finds itself in. It 
is also very apparent that no single approach explains all 
animal action selection behavior.  
Each  factor  theory  is  characterized  by  the  underlying 
assumption  that  immediately  observable  and  measurable 
behavior results from sensations arising from the interaction 
between the general environment of the organism (including 
its body) and its sense organs.  
The issue under debate was the principles by which that 
interaction  was  to  be  characterized.  In  itself,  expressed 
behavior gives little indication of which, indeed, if any, of 
these  theories  best  describes  the  internal  action  selection 
mechanism that gives rise to the observable behavior. 
The task, then, is to provide a minimal description of the 
principles  underlying  the  mechanisms  involved  that 
recognizes  natural  diversity,  yet  covers  the  range  of 
phenomena  observed.  This  paper  identifies  where  these 
mechanisms clearly differ, and where they are apparently 
different, but can be explained as manifestations of a single 
type  of  mechanism,  and  how  these  differences  may  be 
resolved  into  a  single,  structured  framework.  Given  the 
range and diversity between individual animals and species, 
there is a fine balance to be struck between highly specific, 
quantitative,  descriptions,  trivially  refuted  due  to  this 
natural  variation  -  and  untestable  generality.  This  paper 
attempts such a balance.  
The  five  factor  approach  described  here  substantially 
extends,  details  and  revises  the  approach  to  anticipatory 
learning  and  behavioral  action  selection  introduced  in 
[Witkowski, 2003]. The approach will be developed in the 
light  of  the  Dynamic  Expectancy  Model  (DEM) 
[Witkowski,  1998,  2000,  2003]  and  its  actual  (C++) 
computer implementation SRS/E. The analysis in this paper 
will  be  performed  mainly  at  the  level  of  the  five  factor 
theories, each of which is itself a digest of many exemplar 
experimental  procedures.  The  paper  will  call  on  specific 
procedures  where  necessary,  and  illustrate  issues  with 
reference to the DEM and its implementation. 
Section 2 provides a thumbnail sketch of each of the five 
factor  theories.  Comprehensive  descriptions  of  the  five 
theories can be found in any textbook of natural learning 
theory  (e.g.  [Bower  and  Hilgard,  1981]).  Section  3 
considers the interface between animal and its environment, 
and  how  issues  of  behavioral  motivation  might  be 
addressed.  Sections  4,  5  and  6  respectively  build  the 
arguments  for  the  structural,  behavioral  and  learning components  of  the  combined  approach.  Section  7 
reconstructs  the  factor  theories  in  the  light  of  these 
component  parts,  and  emphasizes  the  role  of  the  action 
selection  policy  map,  which  may  be  either  static  or 
dynamic.  Section  8  describes  an  arbitration  mechanism 
between  these  policy  maps,  leading  to  final  action 
expression.  
2    The Five Factor Theories 
The  first  of  the  five  factor  theories  takes  the  form  of 
Stimulus-Response  (S-R)  Behaviorism;  which  holds  that 
action  (the  “response”)  selection  is  determined  by  the 
current sensory condition (the “stimulus”). Although first 
proposed in the final years of the 19
th century [Thorndike, 
1898], the approach continues to find contemporary support 
in  the  work  of  [Brooks,  1991;  Bryson,  2000;  and  Maes, 
1991].  This  behavior  is  not  defined  by  degree.  The 
stimulus-response unit could be as apparently simple as a 
low-level reflex, such as the blink of an eye in response to a 
puff  of  air.  Alternatively,  behavioral  repertories  of 
considerable complexity can be postulated from essentially 
reactive  models  [Tyrrell,  1993;  Tinbergen,  1951].  Such 
behaviors are generally considered to be innate (genetically 
determined) to the individual. Learning in the behaviorist 
regime  is  reward  based,  strengthening  or  weakening  the 
connection  between  stimulus  and  response.  It  may  be 
conjectured that not all such behaviors will be amenable to 
learning at the same rate, if at all. 
The  second  factor  theory,  classical  conditioning,  was 
proposed  by  Ivan  Pavlov  (1849-1936)  following 
observations  that  some  innate  reflexes  can  be  associated 
with  an  otherwise  neutral  stimulus  by  repeated  pairing, 
which will in turn elicit the reflex action. The procedure is 
highly repeatable and is easily demonstrated across a wide 
range  of  reflexes  and  species,  and  has  been  extensively 
modeled both mathematically and by implementation (e.g. 
[Vogel et al., 2004], for recent review).  
The third theory, operant or instrumental conditioning, 
proposed  by  B.F.  Skinner  (1904-1990),  who  argued  that 
actions were not “elicited” by impinging sensory conditions, 
but  “emitted”  by  the  animal  in  anticipation  of  a  desired 
reward outcome. The effect is also highly repeatable under 
appropriate conditions, and it is clear that, given a suitable 
source  of  reward,  an  animal’s  (or  indeed,  a  person’s) 
behavior  can  be  modified  (“shaped”) at will by judicious 
application of this principle. Whilst enormously influential 
in  its  time,  only  a  relatively  small  number  of  computer 
models follow this approach (e.g. [Saksida et al., 1997], or 
Schmajuk  [1994]  implementing  Mowrer’s  [1956]  “two-
factor”  theory,  incorporating  both  classical  and  operant 
conditioning effects.) 
The fourth theory, the “cognitive” model, proposed by 
E.C. Tolman [1932] describes a three-part basic cognitive 
unit, which establishes the expectation or anticipation of a 
specific  stimulus  following,  and contingent on, an action 
taken  in  the  immediate  context  of  another stimulus. The 
context stimulus and action provide the means to achieve a 
desired and anticipated stimulus, the end. Tolman’s means-
ends  approach  both  inspired  and  continues  to  be  a 
fundamental technique of problem solving and planning for 
artificial  intelligence  ([Russell  and  Norvig,  1995],  for 
instance).  The  Dynamic  Expectancy  Model  (DEM) 
[Witkowski,  1998;  2000;  2003]  and  the  Anticipatory 
Classifier System (ACS) model [Stoltzmann et al., 2000] 
represent recent three-part cognitive models. 
A fifth theoretical position, broadly characterized by the 
term associationism (e.g. [Hebb, 1949]), concerns the direct 
associability and anticipation of stimuli following repeated 
pairing of activations. While of greater significance in other 
aspects of animal modeling, this approach does not directly 
incorporate an action component, and discussion of it will 
be restricted here to a minor supporting role in the action 
selection problem.  
3    Sense, Action and Valence 
For largely historical reasons sensations are widely referred 
to as stimuli in this body of literature and the actions or 
behaviors  generated  as  responses.  This  is  not  entirely 
satisfactory,  as  it  largely  fails  to  capture  the  range  of 
interpretations required by the five theories taken together. 
Consequently,  this  paper  will  refer  to  the  sense-derived 
component as a sensory signature or Sign, and denote such 
events  by  the  symbol  S,  sub-scripts  will  be  used  to 
differentiate  Signs  were  necessary.  The  philosophically 
neutral  term  sense  data  might  also  be  employed  for this 
purpose  (e.g.  [Austin,  1962]).  In  the  SRS/E  model, S := 
{0,1}. 
Equally, the term “response” seems pejorative, and the 
more  neutral  term  Action  will  be  preferred,  similarly 
abbreviated to A. Each Action will have associated with it 
an  action  cost,  ac,  (in  SRS/E,  by  definition,  ac  ³  1) 
indicating the time, effort or resource required to perform it.  
Any  Action  may  also be assigned an activation level, 
determined  according  to  the  rules  presented  later.  Once 
activated, an Action becomes a candidate for expression, in 
which the Action is performed by the animal and may be 
observed or measured directly. 
A Sign will be defined as a conjunction of detectable 
conditions  (or  their  negations,  acting  as  inhibitory 
conditions), typically drawn directly from the senses. Any 
Sign where all the conditions currently hold is said to be 
active. A Sign may be activated by some very specific set of 
detected sensory conditions, or be active under a wide range 
of  conditions,  corresponding  to  highly  differentiated  or 
generalized sensing.  
Any Sign that is anticipated, but not active, is termed 
sub-active. Sub-activation is a distinct condition from full 
activation.  It  is  important  to  distinguish  the  two,  as  the 
prediction of a Sign event is not equivalent to the actual 
event, and they have different propagation properties.  
Additionally, any Sign may assume a level of valence 
(after [Tolman, 1932]), the extent to which that Sign has 
goal  like  properties,  indicating  that  it  may  give  the 
appearance of driving or motivating the animal to directed 
action  selection  behavior.  Valence  may  be  positive  (goal 
seeking  or  rewarding)  or  negative  (initiating  avoidance behaviors or being aversive). A greater valence value will 
be taken as more motivating, or rewarding, than a lesser 
one.  Some  Signs  will  hold  valence  directly,  some  via 
propagation to other Signs holding valence. 
As with activation and sub-activation, the valence and 
sub-valence  properties  may  also  be  propagated  between 
Signs under the conditions described in section 5. A Sign 
that is the direct source of valence is deemed satisfied once 
it has become active, and it and the propagated chain of sub-
valenced Signs will revert to their normal, unvalenced, state 
(unless there are multiple sources of direct valence).  
4    The Forms of Connection 
The anticipatory stance proposes that the principal effects of 
the  five  target  theories  can  be  adequately  explained  by 
adopting a combination of three connection types, and that 
their  underlying  function  is  to  provide  a  temporally 
predictive  link  between  different  Sign  and  Action 
components. While noting that the model described here is 
highly  abstracted,  its  biologically  inspired  background 
grounds it in the notion that, in nature, these abstract links 
represent physical neural connections between parts of the 
animal’s nervous system and brain. These links, and such 
properties  as  sub-activation  and  valence,  represent 
conjectures  (from  experimental  observation)  about  the 
function of the brain that may be corroborated or refuted by 
further investigation.  
With  the  exception  of  a  connection  of  type  C1,  the 
abstract  link  types  proposed  below  are  bi-directional. 
Propagation effects across these links are asymmetric, and 
these properties are discussed in section 5.  
This  is  not  intended  to  imply  that  there  are  “bi-
directional neurons”, only that the structures that construct 
these linking elements have a complexity suited to the task. 
Where the animal does not possess a link or type of link (on 
the  basis  of  its  genetic  makeup)  it  will  be  congenitally 
incapable  of  displaying  a  corresponding  class  of  action 
selection behavior or learning. Of course, there are many 
other  possible  connection  formats  between  arbitrary 
combinations of Signs and Actions; but it will be argued 
that these are sufficient to explain the principal properties of 
the five factor theorems. 
Connection type C1 (SA):     S1  
w￿t±t (A Ù S2) 
Connection type C2 (SS):      S1  
v, c￿t±t S2 
Connection type C3 (SAS):   (S1 Ù A)  
v, c￿t±t  S2   
While  connections  of  type  C1  have  only  an  implicit 
anticipatory role, connection types C2 and C3 are both to be 
interpreted as making explicit anticipatory predictions. 
The  type  C1  connection  (“SA”)  is  a  rendition  of  the 
standard S-R behaviorist mechanism, with a forward only 
link from an antecedent sensory condition initiating (or at 
least predisposing the animal to initiate) the action A, as 
represented by the link “￿”. This symbol should definitely 
not be associated with logical implication, its interpretation 
is causal not truth preserving. The symbol t will indicate 
temporal delay (with range “±t”), which may be introduced 
between the sense and action parts. The (optional) Sign S2 is 
postulated as a mechanism for reinforcement learning, and 
is  not  required  where  learning  across  the  connection 
(updating w) is not observed. The conjunctive connective 
symbol “Ù” should be read as “co-incident with”. 
In keeping with standard behaviorist modeling, w will 
stand to indicate the strength, or weight, of the connection. 
This weight value will find application in selecting between 
candidate  connections,  and  in  considering  reinforcement 
learning. Traditionally, the strength of the stimulus and a 
habituation  mechanism  for  the  action  would  also  be 
postulated ([Hull, 1943], for a comprehensive discussion of 
these  and  related  issues).  Specifically  the  strength  or 
likelihood of the response action will be modulated by the 
strength of the stimulus Sign.  
4.1 Explicitly Anticipatory Connection Types 
Connection type C2 notates a link between two Signs, and 
indicates that Sign S1 anticipates or predicts the occurrence 
of Sign S2 within the specific time range t±t in the future. 
This  is  indicated  by  the  right  facing  arrow  in  the  link 
symbol  “￿”.  The  link  has  a  corroboration  value,  c, 
associated  with  it,  indicating  the  reliability  of  that 
prediction, based on continuing prior observation. A generic 
corroboration  value  update  rule  will  be  considered  in 
section 6.1.  
The valence value, v, of S1 is a function of the current 
value of the valence value of S2, and is hence associated 
with the left facing part of the link. Where the value t±t is 
near zero, the link is essentially symmetric, S1 predicts S2 as 
much  as  S2  predicts  S1.  This  is  the  classical  Hebbian 
formulation. Where t is greater than zero (negative times 
have no interpretation in this context), the link is considered 
asymmetric. The assertion that S1 predicts S2 is no indicator 
that S2 also predicts S1. As the relationship between the two 
Signs is not necessarily causal, the animal may hold both 
hypotheses simultaneously and independently, as separate 
C2 connections. 
The C3 connection differs from C2 by the addition of an 
instrumental Action on the left hand side. The prediction of 
S2 is now contingent on the simultaneous activation of both 
S1 and the action A. The interpretation of the corroboration 
value c and the temporal offset t and range t remain the 
same. The transfer of valence v to S1 needs to now be a 
function  of  both  S2  and  the  action  cost  of  A.  This 
connection can be read as “the Sign S2 is anticipated at time 
t in the future as a consequence of performing the action A 
in  the  context  of  S1”.  Equally,  it  may  serve  as  an 
instrumental operator: “to achieve S2 at time x in the future, 
achieve S1 at time x-t, and perform action A”. Such links 
also take the form of independent hypotheses, giving rise to 
specific predictions that may be corroborated. 
5    The Forms of Propagation 
The  five  “rules  of  propagation”  presented  in  this  section 
encapsulate  the  operations  on  the  three  connection  types 
with regard to the five factor theories. The rules define (i) 
when  an  Action  becomes  a  candidate  for expression, (ii) when  a  Sign  will  become  sub-activated,  (iii)  when  a 
prediction will be made, and (iv) when a Sign will become 
valenced by propagation.  
In  the  semi-formal  notation  adopted  below  active(), 
sub_active(),  expressed(),  valenced()  and  sub_valenced() 
may be treated as predicate tests on the appropriate property 
of the Sign or Action. Thus active(S1) will be asserted if the 
Sign denoted by S1 is active. The disjunction “Ú” should be 
read conventionally as either or both, the conjunction “Ù” 
should be interpreted as in section 4. On the right hand side 
of the rule, activate(), predict() and sub_valence() should be 
taken as “internal actions”, operations taken to change the 
state or status of the item(s) indicated. 
Rule P1 Direct Activation:  
For any C1 (SA) link,  
if (active(S1) Ú sub_active(S1))  
then activate(A, w)  
Rule P2 Sign Anticipation:  
For any C2 (SS) link,  
if (active(S1) Ú sub_active(S1))  
then sub_active(S2) 
Rule P3 Prediction:  
For any C2 (SS) link,  
if(active(S1))  
then predict(S2, t±t) 
For any C3 (SAS) link,  
if(active(S1) Ù expressed(A))  
then predict(S2, t±t) 
Rule P4 Valence transfer:  
For any C2 (SS) link,  
if(valenced(S2) Ú sub_valenced(S2))  
then sub_valence(S1, f(v(S2), d)) 
For any C3 (SAS) link,  
if(valenced(S2) Ú sub_valenced(S2))  
then sub_valence(S1, f(v(S2), c, ac(A))) 
Rule P5 Valenced activation:  
For any C3 (SAS) link,  
if(active(S1) Ù sub_valenced(S1))  
then activate(A, v’) 
Rule  P1  expresses  the  standard  S-R  behaviorist  rule. 
Only in the simplest of animals would the activation of the 
action A lead to the direct overt expression of the action or 
activity. As there is no assumption that Signs are mutually 
exclusive,  many  actions  may  become  candidates  for 
expression.  The  simplest  strategy  involves  selecting  a 
“winner” based on the weightings and putting that action 
forward to the effector system for external expression. 
Rule  P2  allows  for  the  propagation  of  sub-activation. 
The  effect  is  instantaneous,  notifying  and  allowing  the 
animal to modify its action selection strategy immediately 
in  anticipation  of  a  possible  future  event.  Evidence from 
second order classical conditioning studies would suggest 
that  sub-activation  propagates  poorly  (i.e.  is  heavily 
discounted).  
Rule P3 allows for a specific prediction of a future event 
to be recorded. This calls for a limited form of memory of 
possible future events, analogous to the more conventional 
notion of a memory of past events. Under this formulation, 
predictions are created as a result of full activation of the 
Sign and actual expression of the Action, and are therefore 
non-propagating. Predictions are made in response to direct 
sense  and  action  and  are  employed  in  the  corroboration 
process  (section  6.1).  This  process  is  distinct  from  sub-
activation, which is propagating, but non-corroborating.  
Rule P4 indicates the spread of valence backwards along 
chains of anticipatory links. The sub_valence() process is 
shown  in  different  forms  for the C2 (SS) and C3 (SAS) 
links,  reflecting  the  discounting  (d)  process  mentioned 
earlier.  As  an  exemplar,  in  the  SRS/E  model  valence  is 
transferred from S2 to S1 across the C3 link according to the 
generic formulation: v(S1) := v(S2) * (c / ac(A)). By learning 
rule L2 and L3 (section 6.1) 0 < c < 1, and as ac(A) ³ 1.0 
(by definition), therefore v(S1) < v(S2). Valence propagates 
preferentially across high confidence links with “easy”  (i.e. 
lower cost value) Actions. Transfer is straightforward and 
has proved robust in operation in the DEM and SRS/E.  
Rule P5 indicates the activation of any Action A where 
the antecedent Sign S1 is both active and valenced. As with 
rule P1, many Actions may be affected. The one associated 
with the highest overall S1 valence value is selected.  
The  choice  process  by  which  the  various  activated 
Actions  give  rise  to  the  action  to  be  selected  for  overt 
expression is the subject of section 8. For a simple S-R only 
(rule P1) system, this might be summarized as selecting the 
action associated with the highest weight value, but there 
must be a balance between the actions activated by rule P1 
and those by P5. Note here that the valence value v’ refers 
to the valence value of the Sign holding direct valence (the 
top-goal),  whose  value  has  been  propagated  to  the  SAS 
link, not that of either S1 or S2 of the C3 (SAS) link in 
question. 
6    The Forms of Learning 
This section describes the conditions under which learning 
will take place. In the anticipatory action selection model 
presented, the net effect of learning is to modify the Actions 
or activities to be expressed (and so the observable behavior 
of the animal) in response to a particular Sign. Each of the 
five factor theories takes a particular stance on the nature of 
learning.  
In the first, reward based learning, learning is taken to 
be  a  consequence  of  the  animal  encountering  a valenced 
situation following an action – one that is characterised as 
advantageous/disadvantageous  and  thus  interpreted  as  
“rewarding”  (or  not)  to  the  animal.  This  is  frequently 
referred  to  as  reinforcement  learning.  There  are  a  wide 
range  of  reinforcement  learning  methods,  so  a  generic 
approach will be adopted here. 
In the second, anticipatory learning, “reward” is derived 
from the success or otherwise of the individual predictions 
made by the propagation rules given in section 5. In one 
sense, the use of link type C3, as described here, can be 
seen as subsuming link type C1, but the converse does not hold. In the C1 link, the role of anticipation in the learning 
process is implicit but is made explicit in the C3 type link.  
Learning rule L1 (the reinforcement rule): 
For any C1 (SA) link  
if (active(A) Ù (valence(S2) Ú sub_valence(S2)))  
then update(w, a) 
This  is  a  generic  form  of  the  standard  reinforcement 
rule.  If  the  action  is  associated  with  any  sensation  that 
provides  valence,  then  the  connection  weight  w  will  be 
updated  asymptotically  by  some  factor  a.  Several  well 
established weight update strategies are available, such as 
Watkins’  Q-learning  and  Sutton’s  temporal  differences 
(TD) method, see [Sutton and Barto, 1998] for review. In 
each the net effect is to increase or decrease the likelihood 
that the link in question will be selected for expression in 
the future.  
6.1 Methods of Anticipatory Learning 
A central tenet of the anticipatory stance described in this 
paper  is that certain connective links in the model make 
explicit predictions when activated. Recall that propagation 
rule  P3  creates  explicit  predictions  about  specific, 
detectable, events that are anticipated to occur in the future, 
within  a  specific  range  of  times  (denoted  by  t±t).  The 
ability  to  form  predictions  has a profound impact on the 
animal’s  choice  for  learning  strategies.  This  section 
considers  the  role  played  by  the  ability  to  make  those 
predictions.  
Learning rule L2 (anticipatory corroboration): 
For any (C2 Ú C3) link  
if(predicted(S2, -t±t) Ù active(S2))  
then update(c, a) 
Learning rule L3 (anticipatory dis-corroboration): 
For any (C2 Ú C3) link,  
if(predicted(S2, -t±t) Ù ¬active(S2))  
then update(c, b) 
Learning rule L4 (anticipatory link formation): 
if(¬predicted(Sx)),  
then create_SAS_link(Sy, Ay, Sx, t, t)  
or create_SS_link(Sy, Sx, t, t) 
These  three  rules  encapsulate  the  principles  of 
anticipatory learning, and are applicable to both C2 and C3 
link  types.  Three  conditions  are  significant,  where  a 
prediction has been made, and the predicted event did occur 
at  the  expected  time  (learning  rule  L2).  The  link  is 
considered  corroborated  and  is  strengthened.  Where  a 
prediction is made, but the event does not occur (learning 
rule  L3),  the  link  is  considered  dis-corroborated  and 
weakened.  Lastly,  where  an  event  occurs,  but  it  was  not 
predicted at all (learning rule L4).  
The  SRS/E  computer  implementation  employs  the 
simple but robust, effective and ubiquitous update rule c := 
c+a (1-c), where (0 ≤ a ≤ 1) for L2, and the generic update 
rule c := c-b(c), where (0 ≤ b ≤ 1), is again simple, effective 
and  robust  for  L3.  Both  update  functions  are  asymptotic 
towards 1.0 and zero respectively. The net effect of these 
update  rules  is  to  maintain  a  form  of  “running average” 
more  strongly  reflecting  recent  outcomes,  with  older 
outcomes  becoming  successively  discounted  (tending  to 
zero contribution). The greater the values of a and b, the 
more aggressively recent events are tracked. The particular 
settings of these values are specific to the individual animal. 
Where  no  prediction  was  made  by  a  rule,  c  remains 
unchanged  regardless  of  the  occurrence  of  S2.  This  is 
consistent with the notion that a rule is only responsible for 
predicting an event under the exact conditions it defines.  
The  key  issue  here  is  that  anticipatory  learning  is 
everytime. Every prediction made, regardless of its cause, 
initiates  learning.  Learning  is  independent  of  valenced 
reward  (this  is  the  phenomenon  of  latent  learning 
[Witkowski,  1998],  [Thistlethwaite,  1951]).  Anticipatory 
links are measured relative to their predictive ability, not 
their  usefulness.  Correct  anticipation  is  its  own  reward. 
Such anticipatory reward is generated locally to the C2 or 
C3  link,  and  is  independent  of  all  others.  Further,  if 
circumstances change, each link adjusts automatically to the 
prevailing  circumstances  based  on  recent  predictive 
experience.  Anticipation  may  also  be  combined  with 
valence,  to  preferentially  focus  the  learning  process  on 
Signs that have, or have had, valence (e.g. the Valence Level 
Pre-Bias technique [Witkowski, 1998]). 
Where an event is unpredicted by any link, this is taken 
as a cue to establish a new link between the unpredicted 
event (as S2) and some recent recently active event (as S1) at 
time t, rule L4. Where a C3 link is created some expressed 
Action A contemporary with the new S1 is also implicated. 
Again the choice of how many new links are formed, and 
the range of values for t and t are specific to the individual 
animal. Without any a-priori indication as to which new 
links  might  be  effective,  higher  learning  rates  can  be 
achieved by forming many links, and then allowing learning 
rules L2 and L3 separate the effective from the ineffective.  
The key issue here is that link learning may be invoked 
everytime a novel or unpredicted Sign is detected. Learning 
may proceed from tabula rasa, and is rapid while much is 
novel. In a restricted environment, link learning will slow as 
more is predicted, but resume if circumstances change.   
No rule for link removal is considered here, but has been 
discussed elsewhere in the context of the DEM. Witkowski 
[2000] considers the rationale for retaining links even when 
their corroboration values fall to very low values, based on 
evidence  from  behavioral  extinction  experiments 
[Blackman, 1974].  
7    Explaining the Five Factors 
This section returns to the action selection factor theories 
outlined in section 2, and will discuss them in turn in terms 
of  the  link  types,  propagation  rules  and  learning  rules 
presented  and  discussed  in  sections  4,  5  and  6.  As 
previously indicated, each theory supports and is supported 
by an (often substantial) body of experimental evidence, but 
that  each  theory  in  turn  fails  to  capture  and  explain  the 
overall range of action selection behaviors displayed by any 
particular  animal  or  species.  The  conceptually  simpler approaches  are  covered  by  single  links  and  rules,  others 
require  a  combination  of  forms,  and  yet  others  perhaps 
require re-interpretation in the light of this formulation.  
7.1   Stimulus-Response Behaviorism 
S-R Behaviorism holds that all, or the majority of, observed 
and intelligent behavior can be ascribed to an innate, pre-
programmed, pairing of sense data driven stimuli and pre-
defined actions.  
7.1.1  Static Policy Maps 
With  no  embellishments,  S-R  behaviorism  is  reduced  to 
connection  type  C1  and  propagation  type  P1.  The 
underlying assumption that all these strategies adopt is to 
tailor the behavior of the organism, such that the actions at 
one  point  sufficiently  change  the  organism  or  its 
environment  such  that  the  next  stage  in  any  complex 
sequence of actions becomes indicated. We may refer to this 
as a static policy map. The DEM records these connections 
in  a  list,  effectively  ordered  by  the  weight  parameter, w. 
Recall  that  the  weighting  value  w  may  be  modified  by 
reinforcement learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998]. 
Given  a  sufficient  set  of  these  reactive  behaviors, the 
overall  effect  can  be  to  generate  exceptionally  robust 
behavioral strategies, apparently goal seeking, in that the 
actually independent elements of sense, action and actual 
outcome combinations, inexorably leads to food, or water, 
or shelter, or a mate [Bryson, 2000; Maes, 1991; Tinbergen, 
1951; Tyrrell, 1993].  
Such  strategies  can appear remarkably persistent, and 
when  unsuccessful,  persistently  inept.  Any  apparent 
anticipatory ability in a fixed S-R strategy is not on the part 
of the individual, but rather a property of the species as a 
whole.  With  sufficient  natural  diversity  in  this  group 
strategy, it can be robust against moderate changes in the 
environment, at the expense of any individuals not suited to 
the changed conditions.  
7.2   Classical Conditioning 
Reactive behaviorism relies only on the direct activity of the 
Sign S1 to activate A, this is the unconditioned response 
(UR) to the unconditioned stimulus (US): the innate reflex. 
As  reflexes  are  typically  unconditionally  expressed  (i.e. 
have high values of w) the US invariably evokes the UR. 
Rule P1 allows for sub-activation of the S1 Sign. Therefore, 
if an anticipatory C2 connection is established between a 
Sign, say SX and the US Sign S1, then activation of SX will 
sub-activate  S1,  and  in  turn  evoke  A,  the  conditioned 
response (CR).  
Note the anticipatory nature of the CS/US pairing [Barto 
and Sutton, 1982], where the CS must precede the US by a 
short delay (typically <1s). The degree to which the CS will 
evoke CR depends on the history of anticipatory pairings of 
SX  and  S1,  and  is  dynamic  according  to  that  history,  by 
learning  rules  L2  and  L3,  the  rates  depending  on  the 
function of α and β. If the link between CS and US is to be 
created dynamically, then learning rule L4 is invoked. The 
higher  order  conditioning  procedure  allows  a  second 
neutral Sign (SY) to be conditioned to the existing CS (SX), 
using the standard procedure: SY now evokes the CR. This 
is as indicated by the propagation of sub-activation in P2. 
Overall, the classical condition reflex has little impact 
on the functioning of the policy map of which its reflex is a 
part. Indeed the conditioned reflex, while widespread and 
undeniable, could be thought of as something of a curiosity 
in learning terms (B.F. Skinner reportedly held this view). 
However, it provides direct, if not unequivocal, evidence for 
several of the rule types presented in this paper.  
7.3  Operant Conditioning 
Operant conditioning shapes the overt behavior of an animal 
by pairing the actions it takes to the delivery of reward. The 
experimenter need only wait for the desired action and then 
present the reward directly. This is typified by the Skinner 
box  apparatus,  in  which  the  subject  animal  (typically  a 
hungry rat) is trained to press a lever to obtain delivery of a 
food pellet reward. We interpret this link as an anticipatory 
one.  The  action  anticipates  the  sensory  condition  (food), 
which,  as  the  rat  is  hungry,  holds  valence.  Further,  the 
experimenter might present the food only when the action is 
taken  in  some  circumstances,  not  others.  The  animal’s 
behavior becomes shaped to those particular circumstances. 
These are the conditions for the C3 connection type. This is 
equivalent to Catania’s [1988] notion of an operant three-
part contingency of “stimulus - response - consequence”.  
The  association  between  lever  (S1),  pressing  (A)  and 
food (S2) is established as a C3 (SAS) link by L4. When the 
action  is  preformed  in  anticipation  of  S2,  the  link  is 
maintained, or not, by L2 and L3 according to the outcome 
of  the  prediction  made  (P3).  While  food  (S2)  retains 
valence, and the rat is at the lever, the rat will press the 
lever (P5), and in the absence of any alternative, continue to 
do so. Action selection is now firmly contingent on both 
encountered Sign and prevailing valence. 
Due  to  valence  transfer  (P4)  such  contingencies 
propagate. Were the rat to be in the box, but not at the lever, 
and some movement AM would take to rat from its current 
location  SC  to  the  lever  SL,  then  the  C3  contingency 
(SCÙAM) ￿ SL would provide propagated valence to SC and 
result in AM being activated for expression. Once the rat is 
satiated,  the  propagation  of  valence  collapses  and  the 
expression  of  these behaviors will cease. This transfer of 
valence  may  be  used  to  create  long  chains  of  behaviors 
(such  as  in  preparing  animals  for  film  performances)  by 
building the sequence back one step at a time. 
Propagation  rule  P4  also  allows  for  secondary  or 
derived reinforcement effects ([Bower and Hilgard, 1981], 
p.184), in which normally non-reinforcing C2 links may be 
paired  with  (or  even  chained  from)  an innately valenced 
one.   
7.4  Tolman’s Expectancy Model 
Catania’s  [1988]  description  of  the  operant  three-part 
contingency, described in the light of this formulation looks 
suspiciously like Tolman’s [1932] Sign-Gestalt Expectancy, 
an explicitly anticipatory three-part Sign-Action-Sign (i.e. 
C3)  link.  Skinner,  as  a staunch “old-school” behaviorist, 
would definitely not have approved! Where the Skinner box investigates the properties of the individual C3 link, which 
may  be  explored  in  detail  under  a  variety  of  different 
schedules, Tolman’s work primarily used mazes. Rats, in 
particular, learn mazes easily, recognize locations readily 
and are soon motivated to run mazes to food or water when 
hungry  or  thirsty.  Mazes  are  also  convenient 
experimentally,  as  they  may  be  created  with  any  desired 
pattern or complexity. 
Choice points and other locations in the maze may be 
represented as Signs (a rat may only be in one location at 
once,  though  it  may  be  mistaken  as  to  which  one),  and 
traversal  between  them  as  identifiable  Actions.  Every 
location-move-location transition may be represented as an 
anticipatory C3 connection. Recall that these links are only 
hypotheses  -  errors,  or imposed changes to the maze are 
accommodated by the learning rules L2, L3 and L4.   
 It is now easy to see that, placed in a maze, the animal 
will learn the structure as a number of C3 connections with 
or without (i.e. latently) the presence of valence or reward. 
Novel  locations  encountered  by  random  (or  guided) 
exploration  invoke  L4,  and  the  confidence  value  c  is 
updated  each  time  a  location  is  revisited,  by  L2  or  L3.  
Once encountered, food may impart valence to a location 
(by P4). 
7.4.1   Dynamic Policy Maps 
If  at  any  time  a  location  becomes  directly  or  indirectly 
linked to a source of valence (i.e. food to a hungry rat), this 
valence will propagate across all the C3 (and indeed C2) 
links to establish a dynamic policy map (DPM). This takes 
the form of a graph of all reachable Signs. In SRS/E this is 
considered  as form of a modified breadth first search, in 
which each Sign node is assigned the highest propagated 
valence value. Again this generic process, as implemented 
in SRS/E, is computationally fast and robust in operation.  
Once  created,  each  Sign  implicated  in  the  DPM  is 
associated  with  a  single  Action  from  the  appropriate  C3 
link, the one on the highest value valence path, and a single 
valence value v, indicating its rank in the policy map. Given 
this one to one, ordered mapping, an action may be selected 
from the DPM in a manner exactly analogous to a static 
policy map. In this respect, the behavior chaining technique 
described in section 7.3 looks to be no more than an attempt 
to manipulate the naturally constructed dynamic policy to 
prefer one chain of actions to all the others. 
The dynamic policy map must be recomputed each time 
there  is  a  change  in  valence or any learning event takes 
place  (i.e.  almost  everytime).  Sometimes  this  has  little 
effect  on  the  observable  behavior,  but  sometimes  has  a 
dramatic and immediate effect, with the animal reversing its 
path or adopting some completely new activity.  
Figure 1 illustrates this (from [Witkowski, 2000]). The 
animat (circle) is in a grid maze, and each square represents 
a location Sign, and the arrows indicate the current policy 
action in that square. The animat was allowed to explore the 
maze  shown  on  the  left  completely  by  selecting  random 
actions,  but  without  any  source  of  valence  (i.e.  latently). 
When G is given valence, the animat builds a DPM and 
takes the shortest path via B. With the animat returned to S, 
and G still valenced, but B now blocked, the DPM will still 
indicate a path via B (the blockage is undiscovered), center. 
As the intended (up) action to B now fails, the DPM alters 
to  prefer  the  apparently  longer  path  via  A,  and  the 
observable behavior of the animat will abruptly change as a 
new DPM is constructed and a new path is preferred, right.    
 
     
Figure 1: Rapid changes in the Dynamic Policy Map 
8   Combining Static and Dynamic Policy Maps 
For  any  animal  that  displays  all  the  forms  of  action 
selection,  it  becomes  essential  to  integrate  the  effects  of 
innate  behaviour,  the  static  policy  map,  and  the  valence 
driven  dynamic  policy  map.  The  dynamic  policy  map  is 
transient, and must interleave with the largely permanent 
static policy map. The valence value of the original source 
(v’ from section 5, the top-goal) is (numerically) equated to 
the C1 connection weight values, w. While v’ ³ active(w), 
actions  are  selected  only  from  the  DPM.  If  at  any  point 
active(w) > v’, DPM selection is suspended, and actions are 
taken from the static policy. Once completed or abandoned, 
control reverts to the DPM.  
This allows for high-priority activities, such as predator 
avoidance, to invariably take precedence over goal-seeking 
activities.  As  the  valence  of  the  goal  task  increases,  the 
chance of it being interrupted in this way decreases. After 
an interruption from static actions, valenced action selection 
resumes, The DPM must be reconstructed, as the animal’s 
situation will have been changed, and the static actions may 
also  have  given  rise  to  learned  changes  –  a  case  of 
everytime learning. 
Static policy maps may also be partitioned. Tinburgen 
[1951]  proposed  the  use  of  hierarchical  Innate  Releaser 
Mechanisms  (IRM)  to  achieve  this.  In  each  case,  the 
releasing enabler should take its place in the static ranking, 
with  all  its  subsidiary  SR  connections  simultaneously 
enabled, but then individually ranked within that grouping. 
Selection may then proceed as for the Dynamic Policy Map 
example. Note that in the DEM, valence setting is reserved 
as  a  static  policy  map  activity,  a  type  of  Action.  In  this 
context  the  IRM  releasing  enablers  start  to  look,  in 
evolutionary terms, like the beginnings of valenced items. 
9   Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has presented a high-level view of the action 
selection properties of five central theories of behavior and 
learning.  Each  of  these  theories  holds  that  actions  are 
selected on the basis of prevailing sensory conditions. They 
do not agree on how this occurs, yet it is clear that it may be 
demonstrated experimentally that each theory accounts for 
only a part of an individual animal’s behavioral repertoire, 
and that what the experimenter sees is at least partly due to 
the design of their experiments. The paper has developed a set  of  five  propagation  rules  and  four  learning  strategies 
over three connection types to encapsulate and unify these 
otherwise apparently disparate approaches.  
This has lead to the notion of different types of policy 
map operating within the animal, from static to dynamic, 
and  how  they  may  be  combined  to  exhibit  apparently 
different  behavioral  phenomena  under  the  variety  of 
circumstances the animal may encounter, in nature or the 
laboratory.  The  Dynamic  Expectancy  Model  has  been 
employed as an implemented (SRS/E) framework for this 
discussion. 
Much remains to be done. This overview paper has laid 
a ground plan, but the devil remains in the detail. There 
exists a truly vast back catalogue of experimental data from 
the last 100 years of investigations that might be revisited in 
the  light  of  this  framework.  Two  substantive  questions 
remain: (i) whether the links, propagation and learning rules 
presented sufficiently describe the five factor theories, and 
(ii) whether, even taken together as a whole, the five factor 
theories are sufficient to explain all animal behavior.  
On the first, the theories are based on these experiments, 
and much falls into place as a consequence. On the second, 
it  seems  unlikely  -  as  evolutionary  pressure  has  lead  to 
incredibly  diverse  behavior  patterns  and  mechanisms. 
Identifying  these  experimentally  observed  exceptions  will 
serve to refine the multi-factor approach presented, leading 
in time to a better, more encompassing, solution.  
Even  though  one  can  observe  classical  and  operant 
conditioning,  and  means-ends  behavior  in  humans,  it  is 
abundantly clear than even taken together the five factors 
fail  to  explain  human  behavior  to  a  very  considerable 
extent. It is vastly apparent that human (and possibly other 
primate)  activities  are  not  solely,  or even predominantly, 
driven  directly  by  immediately  prevailing  and  observable 
circumstances.  However,  one  might  see  these  five 
mechanisms as both a foundation for, and a bridge to, the 
evolutionary  development  of  higher-level  cognitive 
functions.  
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